FAQs on demographic change

Most demographic trends in Eastern Europe are not that different from the rest of Europe: birth rates are generally low, women start having children later in life and populations are getting older. What sets Eastern Europe apart is outmigration. Over the past three decades, several million people have left the countries in the region to look for better opportunities elsewhere, mostly in European Union countries. In the absence of significant immigration, most countries in Eastern Europe have seen their population numbers go down, in some cases by as much as 30 per cent or more since 1990. In Ukraine right now, these trends are worsened by the impact of the war, which has driven millions of refugees out of the country, increased mortality and led to a collapse of birth rates.

There is no question that population ageing and a decrease in population numbers present significant challenges for the countries affected. As the number and share of working-age people is decreasing, pressure is rising on the sustainability of social protection systems. The depopulation of rural areas makes it costly to maintain public services and infrastructure for a shrinking number of – often mostly older – people. There are concerns about economic performance and the potential for innovation as the workforce is shrinking and many young people and skilled workers leave and work abroad.

These challenges are real, and they require responses. But the discourse around demographic change is often driven by anxiety, or even panic. This has led to responses that are misguided and, in some cases, harmful. What we need instead are solutions that consider the complex social, economic and cultural factors influencing demographic change, that are based on sound evidence, and that are centred on the rights and needs of people.

Much of the public discourse around demographic change in Eastern Europe is centred around low birth rates. It is true that total fertility rates are low in the region, and all countries have rates below 2.1 children per woman, the level that is generally considered needed for a population to remain stable (in the absence of migration). But fertility rates in the region range roughly between 1.3 and 1.8 children per woman, which is not different from the rest of Europe. The difference is that unlike the countries in Western Europe, which have seen their populations remain stable, or even increase, due to immigration, the Eastern Europe region has experienced significant population decline because of outmigration and the absence of significant immigration to compensate for losses in population numbers. In fact, the data shows that in most countries in Eastern Europe, outmigration has been the main driver of population decrease.

Decreasing fertility rates is a global trend that we can observe in an ever-larger number of countries around the world. More than two-thirds of the world population already live in countries with fertility rates below replacement level. This trend has been accompanied by one of the most successful transformations in human history: the process of liberating women from traditional gender roles, discrimination and violence, and expanding access to education and the workforce. All over the world, women are increasingly empowered to make decisions about their bodies and lives. This is a basic human right, and the fact that more and more women can make these choices freely is one of the greatest achievements in human development. The broader impact is huge: fewer women die giving birth, more newborns survive, smaller families mean more investments in a smaller number of children with better educational outcomes, more women can complete their education and enter the workforce – the list goes on and on. UNFPA’s work, together with partners, to ensure women have access to family planning information, services and supplies has been a crucial enabler of this success.

Societies have benefited tremendously from the increasing inclusion of women in public life and the economy, and the accompanying shifts in social norms. Women are not valued any longer primarily for their role in reproduction, but as equal members of society with equal rights and dignity. This has also meant that social pressure and expectations on women to have children have diminished. And with greater legal equality and economic independence, women increasingly can make their own choices about whether and when to have children, and how many.

The choices people make around having children are influenced by a complex mix of personal, social and economic factors. Generally, in high-income countries, people would like to have more children than they end up having. Governments have tried to influence people’s fertility choices and get women to have more children. Some have offered financial incentives such as baby bonuses or tax breaks. Others have even moved to limit women’s reproductive rights, for example, by making it harder to access abortion and contraceptives. None of these measures have led to lasting significant increases in fertility rates. Even in countries with generous institutionalized support for families, such as France and the Nordic countries, fertility rates have remained below replacement level and have recently declined.

Even if it were possible to easily boost fertility rates, the effects would only be felt many years later and, if other challenges remain unaddressed, might just add to emigration pressure – and to young people taking public investment in their education with them when they leave.

In virtually all countries in Europe for which there is data, people on average say they want two or more children, but they end up having one or none. This means that there is a gap between fertility intentions and realized fertility that could be closed by creating environments in which people feel secure and confident to have the number of children they want. This is the space governments have to make a difference: by expanding family policies, including childcare, in a gender-responsive way, addressing discriminatory gender norms, removing the many penalties that come with motherhood, changing workplace cultures, strengthening economies of care, redistributing unpaid care responsibilities, and other measures to make it easier for people to have the number of children they desire.

While these investments can help increase birth rates, they have broader positive effects for families, societies and economies. For example, investing in gender-responsive family policies makes it easier for people to join the labour force and pursue their careers while having children, and it also helps countries prepare for the effects of demographic change by increasing the number of women in the workforce.

Given the complexity of factors affecting fertility choices, and how difficult some of them are to address, there is no guarantee that even comparably generous and comprehensive measures will actually have the desired effects. Ultimately, governments cannot force people to have more children, nor should they try to infringe on people’s reproductive rights.

The bottom line is: there is a lot governments can do to make having children easier, and these measures should be pursued because they are good for individuals, families and society, irrespective of their effect on fertility rates.

Eastern Europe’s demographic woes are, to a large extent, symptoms of wider systemic dysfunctions. Young people struggle to find good education, affordable housing and stable jobs. Their countries are often plagued by political instability and corruption. These are some of the main factors driving young people out of their countries and making it hard for those who remain to start families. It is easier to call on women to have more children than to fix the problems that cause people to leave and give up on their fertility aspirations. Focusing on fertility rates conveniently puts the onus on women and distracts from failures of governance. It tends to see solutions to demographic challenges in limiting women’s rights, rather than tackling much-needed reforms to improve people’s well-being and opportunities. The focus on fertility rates in the public discourse is counterproductive and potentially harmful: it distracts from real solutions to demographic challenges and risks reversing decades of progress on gender equality, reproductive rights and women’s empowerment, with potentially far-reaching negative consequences for countries’ stability and development.

Investing in gender equality and women’s empowerment in many ways contributes to strengthening countries’ abilities to deal with demographic change. For example, research suggests that, among high-income countries, those with greater gender equality tend to have higher fertility rates. Empowering women to participate fully in the workforce boosts GDP and can help mitigate the effects of an ageing population and shrinking workforce. By implementing gender-responsive family policies such as parental leave and flexible work arrangements, and by providing affordable, accessible childcare and eldercare services, governments can enable both women and men to balance work and family responsibilities. This can, in turn, lead to higher fertility rates and increased labour force participation.

Women still pay a high price for having children. They often are the primary or even sole caregivers. As a result, many mothers drop out of education or employment. When they manage to remain in the labour force, they tend to earn less, get overlooked for promotions, end up in lower-paid jobs and face stigma and discrimination at the workplace. Removing these “motherhood penalties” and distributing care roles more equally between women and men would go a long way in creating societies where having children is not penalized, but valued as a contribution to the sustainable future of society.

Evidence shows that financial incentives alone do not lead to significantly higher fertility in the long term. The current measures show at best short-term effects, as people may decide to have a child earlier, but this generally does not significantly affect the total number of children women have over their lifetime (“completed cohort fertility”). A few countries have managed to increase (short-term) fertility rates as a result of monetary incentives, but a closer look at (long-term) cohort fertility shows that the actual number of children has barely gone up. Not only are such programmes largely ineffective, they also are very costly. Apart from the direct costs of monetary transfers, there are indirect costs, too. Studies have shown that cash benefits tend to drive women out of the workforce. This means lower tax revenues and higher numbers of women dependent on social transfers. Isolated cash programmes also risk contributing to cycles of poverty by raising birth rates among lowest-income populations without providing sustainable support in the long run.

No, this is a common myth. There is no correlation between the use of modern family planning methods and fertility levels in Europe. For example, according to UN data, Albania has the lowest prevalence of modern contraceptives in Europe (6 per cent), and also one of the lowest fertility rates (1.37). France, on the other hand, has one of Europe’s highest modern contraceptive prevalence rates (76 per cent), and also one of the highest fertility rates (1.78). The example of Georgia shows that an increase in modern contraceptive usage rates and higher fertility rates can go hand in hand:

But improving access to sexual and reproductive health, including modern contraceptives, should not be considered only in relation to its effects on fertility rates. Its value is much broader, for individuals and for societies, including those facing demographic challenges. When women can get quality sexual and reproductive health information and services, they can plan and time their pregnancy and realize their fertility intentions in accordance with their educational, career and other life aspirations. This, in turn, can help boost women’s labour force participation and overall human capital development.

Not really. It is true that in theory, and all other factors excluded, a population would retain its size if the total fertility rate were at replacement level, i.e. every woman gave birth to 2.1 children on average. In practice, this number is largely irrelevant. This is because other factors such as mortality and – especially important in Europe – migration also affect population size. Moreover, most experts agree that an ideal fertility rate does not exist. A country with high youth unemployment and large outmigration, for example, might not benefit from higher fertility because more young people would put additional strains on the job market, create extra education costs and add to emigration pressure. Increases in productivity can compensate for lower fertility rates when it comes to economic growth. There is ample evidence that countries with below-replacement fertility can thrive; Germany and Japan are good examples.

The challenges that come with population decrease and population ageing can, to some extent, be mitigated by improvements in healthy life expectancy. In several countries in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region, life expectancy is lower than in countries of a similar level of development. This is largely due to the low life expectancy of men, mostly caused by high rates of alcohol consumption and other unhealthy behaviours and lifestyle choices coupled with poor health literacy and weak health systems. The gap between the life expectancy of men and women is as high as ten years in some countries. This has a significant negative impact on productivity and care costs. As populations are ageing, ensuring that people stay healthy and active in older age will become ever more important. Investments in people from earliest childhood onward is important for active and healthy ageing, and alongside investments in productivity, it can help countries take advantage of a longevity dividend and accelerate economic development.

Demographic resilience is the capacity to understand and anticipate, plan for, and shape population dynamics, and to have the skills, tools, political will and public support to manage them. In this way, countries can mitigate potentially negative effects for individuals, societies, economies and the environment, and harness the opportunities that come with demographic change for people, prosperity and the planet. UNFPA is supporting countries in strengthening their capacities to address demographic change through a regional programme focused on four pillars: policy, human capital, system reform and public support.

In contrast to Eastern Europe, the demographic situation in Central Asia is marked by high fertility rates (between 2.6 and 3.1 children per woman) and strong population growth. The increase in population numbers is tempered by low life expectancy (at around 70 years) and high levels of outmigration (in 2020, some 7.8 million Central Asians lived abroad). All Central Asian states have young populations, with between 43 and 54 percent of the population under 25 years old.

The concept of demographic resilience is equally relevant in low and high fertility contexts. It puts the emphasis on solutions to population concerns that are comprehensive, based on sound evidence, and consistent with human rights and gender equality. Whether in high or low fertility contexts, experience around the world has shown that solutions work best when they are people-centered, human capital-oriented and expand people’s choices.

A key challenge in Central Asia is how best to utilize the enormous potential that lies in countries’ youthful populations. With their age structures, the countries in the subregion are in a prime position to reap the benefits of the demographic dividend. This requires growth-oriented economic policies and a good investment climate, as well as the right investments in infrastructure, technology and human capital. There are many things governments can do to strengthen human capital. This includes promoting gender-responsive family policies, improving access to healthcare, and expanding access to family planning, which is key for ensuring that people can decide on the number of children they want, and space the births of their children to limit interference with educational and career plans. Addressing gender inequalities is also crucial: widespread discrimination, exclusion and violence are major barriers for human capital development as they prevent women and girls from participating in the economy and society, and limit their opportunities and choices, leaving much of their potential untapped. Another example is comprehensive life skills education. Building knowledge and skills among young people on relationships and the changes their bodies are undergoing brings huge benefits, including with regard to avoiding teenage pregnancy, one of the great disruptors of human capital development.

By taking these and other steps, countries in Central Asia can build an environment for young people fulfil their potential and be the engine for a prosperous future.

Overall, people across the world live longer and healthier lives, driven by advances in health care and other factors. The rise in life expectancy is a reason to celebrate, even though progress is slow for men in some countries of the region (see above). But as people live longer – and have fewer children – the share of older people in the total population has been increasing. Populations are ageing particularly fast in Eastern Europe, where the outmigration of – often young – people has accelerated this trend.

Rapid population ageing can pose a range of challenges, including growing pressures on pension and other social protection systems, and changing demands for care services and other vital infrastructure. The situation of older women requires special attention, as they often struggle with loneliness and poverty caused by the cumulative effects of life-long discrimination and exclusion.

With the right attitudes and policies in place, population ageing does not naturally represent a danger to the social and economic development of societies. By anticipating and addressing changes in age structures ahead of time, and countering harmful age-based stereotypes and discrimination, countries can mitigate the challenges and harness the opportunities presented by an ageing population.

This requires measures to support people to stay healthy throughout their life course, ensure that older people can remain active in the workforce and in public life beyond the traditional retirement age if they so wish, and promote societies for all ages, free from age-related stigma and discrimination.

A country’s human capital is the health, knowledge, skills and experiences possessed collectively by its inhabitants. Societies with greater human capital tend to be more productive and innovative and find it easier to adapt to demographic change. For example, when people are healthy and well-educated in older age, they can continue to be active in the economy and public life, contributing their skills and experiences, and they are less likely to rely on social support transfers. Similarly, if young women are empowered to have control over their bodies and fertility, they are more likely to complete their education, find a good job and become financially independent.

In both low- and high-fertility contexts, building human capital is key to addressing demographic change successfully. This requires tackling discrimination and other barriers that make it difficult for people, including women and other disadvantaged groups, to access health care, education and the job market and to succeed in the economy and other spheres of society.

In Central Asia, where populations are young and the share of working-age people is increasing, countries have an opportunity to realize the demographic dividend, provided they channel resources into human capital development, in addition to investments in infrastructure and technology.

In the context of low fertility rates and, in many countries, shrinking populations, fostering inclusive societies is key. The goal of reducing inequalities and making societies more inclusive is not only a human rights imperative and one of the objectives under the Sustainable Development Goals. It is also an essential element of strategies to tackle demographic change, in particular in countries with shrinking populations. As population numbers go down and workforces shrink, countries simply cannot afford to keep large segments of society in the margins, excluded from mainstream society. There is enormous untapped potential in the millions of women and members of minority communities or other disadvantaged groups that face barriers in accessing health care, education and the job market. Combating discrimination and removing other barriers will empower more people to realize their potential, join the workforce, and contribute to, and benefit from, their country’s social and economic development. Everybody counts – especially in countries where population numbers are on the decline.

Ultimately, the best way to address demographic change is for countries to create conditions that allow people to have confidence in their future and that of their families. If people, especially young people, have access to quality education and health care, if they are in stable employment and get support for raising their children, they are less likely to emigrate and more likely to decide to have children. This is especially the case when women – and men – are able to combine work and family and there is a fair division of unpaid care and domestic work within the household. Population numbers are important. But even more important than quantity are individuals’ capacities, skills and talents, as well as their health and productivity. This is why countries that focus on nurturing and utilizing their population’s human capital and attract talent from abroad are able to thrive and remain competitive even in a context of low fertility and population ageing.